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Abstract
Sequential attack detection in a distributed estimation system is considered, where each sensor
successively produces one-bit quantized samples of a desired deterministic scalar parameter corrupted
by additive noise. The unknown parameters in the pre-attack and post-attack models, namely the desired
parameter to be estimated and the injected malicious data at the attacked sensors pose a significant
challenge for designing a computationally efficient scheme for each sensor to detect the occurrence of
attacks by only using local communication with neighboring sensors. The generalized Cumulative Sum
(GCUSUM) algorithm is considered, which replaces the unknown parameters with their maximum like-
lihood estimates in the CUSUM test statistic. For the problem under consideration, a sufficient condition
is provided under which the expected false alarm period of the GCUSUM can be guaranteed to be larger
than any given value. Next, we consider the distributed implementation of the GCUSUM. We first propose
an alternative test statistic which is asymptotically equivalent to that of GCUSUM. Then based on the
proposed alternative test statistic and running consensus algorithms, we propose a distributed approximate
GCUSUM algorithm which significantly reduce the prohibitively high computational complexity of the
centralized GCUSUM. Numerical results show that the distributed approximate GCUSUM algorithm can
provide a performance that is comparable to the centralized GCUSUM.
Index Terms
Cyberattack, generalized CUSUM, running consensus algorithms, distributed estimation, one-bit
quantization.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Applications of sensor networks for parameter estimation, ranging from inexpensive commercial sys-
tems to complex military and homeland defense surveillance systems, have been extensively studied in
recent literature [1]. Typically, large-scale sensor networks consist of low-cost and spatially distributed
sensors with limited battery power and low computing capability, which makes the system vulnerable to
cyberattacks by adversaries. This has led to great interest in studying the vulnerability of sensor networks
in various applications, see [2]–[9] and the references therein.
Recently, one-bit quantization has been increasingly gaining attention in the applications of sensor
networks and other systems like massive MIMO communication systems, see [10]–[15] for instance.
The application of one-bit quantization in such systems is partially motivated by the fact that the
power consumption of the analog-to-digital (ADC) converters grows exponentially with the number of
quantization bits [16]. One-bit ADC consists of a simple comparator which does not require automatic
gain control or a highly linear amplifier, and therefore can be implemented with very low cost and
power consumption [17]. This paper considers a spatially distributed sensor network estimation system
employing one-bit quantization under the assumption that the measurements from a subset of sensors are
under the threat of attacks.
There are primarily two types of sensor network architectures, depending on whether or not there exists
a fusion center (FC). In the presence of an FC, all sensor data is collected and processed at the FC. Thus,
one of major challenges associated with this type of sensor networks arises from the communication
burden from sensors to the FC, especially when sensors are widely deployed and far away from the FC.
For the other type of sensor networks without an FC, which are referred to as distributed sensor networks,
the sensors are connected to their neighboring sensors, which allow them to exchange data using local
short-range communication. In a distributed sensor network, each sensor needs to make its own inference
based on its own information and the information received from its neighboring sensors. The information
aggregation in distributed sensor networks has been extensively studied. Most of the existing literature
focuses on the fixed-sample-size paradigm, where every sensor starts with some samples and aims to
obtain the average of all samples in the distributed sensor network through inter-sensor information
exchange. The most popular information exchange protocols are the “consensus algorithm” and “gossip
algorithm”, whose comprehensive surveys can be found in [18] and [19], respectively. In these works,
a new sample is not allowed to enter into the system during the process of inter-sensor information
exchange, and hence they are only relevant to the fixed-sample-size inference problems.
3In distributed sequential inference problems, with successively arriving samples, the more practical
scenario is that the sampling and information aggregation processes take place simultaneously, or at
least in comparable time-scales. Under this setup, [20] proposed the “consensus + innovation” approach
for distributed recursive parameter estimation; [21] investigated the problem of tracking a stochastic
process using a “running consensus” algorithm. The distributed sequential change-point detection based
on running consensus algorithms has not been well investigated.
In this paper, we consider the problem of detecting the occurrence of attacks in a distributed sensor
network estimation system with quantized data as quickly as possible while the expected false alarm
period is under control. The sequential change-point detection, also known as quickest detection, which
minimizes the expected detection delay subject to certain performance constraint on the expected false
alarm period, suits well to this kind of problems. Various change-point detection methods have been
developed based on the well-known Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm [22], [23]. However, most of
the existing approaches either focus on the case where no unknown parameter exists, or require an FC
that collects information (raw data or statistics) from all sensors to implement the algorithm, since the
test statistic of the CUSUM algorithm accumulates the log-likelihood ratio of each data nonlinearly. Here,
we propose a new distributed change-point detection procedure based on running consensus algorithms,
which allows each sensor in the network to detect the occurrence of attacks even though there are unknown
parameters.
A. Summary of Results
In this work, we consider the sequential attack detection in a distributed sensor network where each
sensor successively makes one-bit quantized samples of a desired deterministic scalar parameter corrupted
by additive noise. The network is composed of two types of sensors. One type of sensors have a very high
level of security and thereby are guaranteed to be tamper-proof. The rest of the sensors are insecure, which
are subject to attacks. In practice, the secure sensors can be well protected, built with powerful chips,
and thereby highly sophisticated encryption algorithms and security procedures can be implemented. At
some time instant, the adversaries may launch attacks at the insecure sensors simultaneously by injecting
different malicious data into these sensors. It is well-known that the CUSUM algorithm is minimax
optimal if the pre-attack and post-attack statistical models of the observations can be specified [24].
However, neither pre-attack nor post-attack models can be specified in our considered problem, since
there are unknown parameters in both statistical models, namely the desired parameter to be estimated
and the injected malicious data. In light of this, we consider a CUSUM-type algorithm based on the
4generalized likelihood ratio (GLR), called the generalized CUSUM (GCUSUM) algorithm, which replaces
the unknown parameters with their maximum likelihood estimates in the CUSUM test statistic.
It is shown that unlike the case where the pre-attack statistical model of the observations can be
specified, the secure data also contributes to the test statistic of the GCUSUM due to the uncertainty
of the desired parameter in the pre-attack statistical model. In addition, unlike the test statistic of the
CUSUM for the case where the pre-attack and post-attack statistical models of the observations can be
specified, the test statistic of the GCUSUM cannot be expressed in a recursive form evolving over time,
which hinders us from efficiently implementing the GCUSUM.
Moreover, the expected false alarm period may not be controlled for the GCUSUM in general. In
order to overcome this, before carrying out the inference task, we secure the system for a period of time
during which the whole system is tamper-proof. A sufficient condition on the length of the secure time
is provided under which the expected false alarm period of the GCUSUM test can be guaranteed to be
larger than any prescribed value. Furthermore, we show that if the length of secure time or the number
of sensors in the network are large enough, the false alarm period the GCUSUM test can be guaranteed
to be arbitrarily large with arbitrarily high probability.
It is worth mentioning that there are two major difficulties in the implementation of the GCUSUM
for the problem under consideration. First, the computation of the test statistic of the GCUSUM requires
centralized processing which brings about a significant communication overhead in large-scale spatially
distributed sensor networks. Second, even if centralized processing is allowed, the computational com-
plexity of the test statistic of the GCUSUM is prohibitively high. Motivated by these facts, we consider
the distributed computation of the test statistic of the GCUSUM. Due to the procedure for estimating the
unknown parameters and the mixed-integer programming in the computation of the test statistic of the
GCUSUM, it is impossible to implement the GCUSUM based on running consensus algorithms, since
the running consensus algorithms essentially can only calculate the weighted sum of local statistics at
the sensors. To facilitate the distributed implementation of the GCUSUM, we first propose an alternative
test statistic as a substitute for the test statistic of the GCUSUM, which is shown to be asymptotically
equivalent to that of the GCUSUM when the secure time is sufficiently long. Similar to the test statistic
of the GCUSUM, this alternative test statistic can be written as a sum of statistics which are contributed
by the secure and insecure data, respectively.
For the statistics contributed by the secure data, we propose a running consensus algorithm which
enables each sensor to produce a local estimate of each statistic. We show that the estimation error
can be bounded from above almost surely when the secure time is sufficiently long. Moreover, this
5upper bound on the estimation error decreases to zero as the number of message-passing steps in the
proposed algorithm increases. To compute the statistic contributed by the insecure data in a distributed
and computationally efficient way, we first relax the constraint of simultaneous attack and assume that
the attack times at different sensors can be different. Then the statistic can be rewritten in a recursive
form which can be calculated at each sensor by employing running consensus algorithms.
B. Related Work
Attack detection in sensor networks using quantized data has been widely investigated, see [2]–[9] and
the references therein. Most of these works investigate the problem of detecting attacks under the fixed-
sample-size paradigm, while this paper focuses on the sequential attack detection. Quickest detection in
sensor networks has also gained a great deal of attention in recent literature, see [25]–[34] for instance.
However, most of these works require an FC to process all local sensor statistics centrally; while in this
work, we consider the sequential attack detection in a distributed sensor network where no FC exists and
each sensor needs to make its own decision based on its own data and the received information from its
neighboring sensors.
The closest works to this paper are [34]–[37], which all focus on the consensus based change-point
detection in distributed sensor networks. Still, there are major differences. In [36], [35] and [34], the
authors assume that the pre-change and post-change distributions are completely known; while in this
work, none of them are completely specified. In [37], a geometric moving average algorithm is employed
for detecting the change; while in this work, we are primarily interested in CUSUM-type algorithms.
A related but different problem, the distributed sequential hypothesis test based on consensus, has
been studied in [38], [39], where the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) is employed to resolve two
hypotheses, which is different from the change detection problem.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The problem statement and background are
described in Section II. The sequential attack detection based on GCUSUM is introduced in Section III. In
Section IV, we propose a distributed approximate GCUSUM algorithm which can be implemented through
running consensus algorithm. In Section V, numerical results are provided to illustrate the performance
of our proposed approach. Finally, Section VI provides our conclusions.
6II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND
A. Problem Statement
We consider a sensor network consisting of N spatially distributed sensors, each sequentially making
observations of a deterministic scalar parameter θ corrupted by additive noise. At the k-th time instant,
the signal presented to the j-th sensor is described by
x
(k)
j = θ + n
(k)
j , (1)
where n
(k)
j denotes the additive noise sample with common cumulative distribution function (cdf) F (·) and
{n
(k)
j } is an independent and identically distributed sequence. We assume that the cdf F (·) is invertible.
Each sensor employs a common one-bit quantizer to covert the analog signal x
(k)
j to the quantized
observation u
(k)
j in the following way
u
(k)
j = 1{x
(k)
j ∈ (τ,∞)}, (2)
where τ is the threshold of the quantizer. We assume that each sensor can only exchange information
with its neighboring sensors, and attempts to produce its estimate of the unknown parameter θ. The inter-
sensor communication links determine the topology of the sensor network, which can be represented by
an undirected graph G = {N , E} with N being the set of sensors and E the set of edges.
We assume that there exist a subset S of sensors which are secure, and we use A = N\S to denote the
set of insecure sensors. The numbers of sensors in S and A are denoted by NS and NA, respectively. It is
worth mentioning that S can be empty. Suppose that after a period of secure time M , some adversaries
launch data injection attacks at some time ta > M at insecure sensors, hoping to cause the sensor
network system to reach an inaccurate estimate of θ. We consider the worst possible scenario regarding
the number of corrupted sensors, and hence, our analysis focuses on the case where the set of all insecure
sensors are corrupted [40]. Accordingly, for any j ∈ A, the observations become x
(k)
j = θ + n
(k)
j , k < ta
x
(k)
j = θ + µj + n
(k)
j , k ≥ ta,
(3)
where µj is an unknown deterministic injected data at the j-th sensor which satisfies
µj ≥ b > 0, ∀j ∈ A. (4)
The quantity b is a prescribed value, setting the lower bound for the measurement change that draws
security attentions. As such, our goal here is to detect the attacks as soon as possible after their occurrence
7at ta. The quickest detection technique, that exploits the statistical difference before and after the change-
point, provides a suitable framework to achieve this goal. For the sake of notational simplicity, we use
{uˇ
(m)
j } to denote the quantized data in the period of secure time, that is, uˇ
(m)
j = u
(m)
j for all j and
m = 1, 2, ...,M , and we relabel u
(M+k)
j in (2) as u
(k)
j for all j and k ≥ 1.
B. Quickest Detection
In quickest detection, we observe samples sequentially in time, and then stop when a predesigned rule
declares a change. Unlike the fixed-sample-size schemes that lay more attention on the detection power,
the sequential change detector aims at minimizing the expected detection delay after the change-point.
The commonly used performance measure is the worst-case expected detection delay, proposed by Lorden
[41]
J (T ) = sup
t
ess supFtEt
[
(T − t)+ |Ft
]
, (5)
where T is a stopping time variable corresponding to a certain detection scheme and Ft is the filtration
generated by all the observations up to time t. The expectation Et is evaluated with respect to the post-
change probability measure conditioned on the change-point t and the all observations up to time t. The
essential supremum is obtained over Ft, yielding the least favorable situation for the expected detection
delay. The supremum in (5) is obtained over t, meaning that the change occurs at such a point that the
expected detection delay is maximized. To summarize, J(T ) characterizes the expected detection delay
for the worst possible history of observations before the change-point. While the small expected detection
delay under attack results in timely alarmed reaction, the running length under unattacked data, on the
other hand, needs to be guaranteed to avoid frequent false alarms. To this end, the sequential change
detection problem is formulated as follows:
inf
T
J (T ) subject to E∞ {T} ≥ κ. (6)
Note that the expectation E∞ is evaluated with respect to the probability measure where no change
occurs, i.e., t = ∞, and κ is a prescribed constant which specifies the required lower bound on the
expected false alarm period. To proceed with our attack detection problem, we denote the probability
measures under no attack and under attack as P0 and P1, respectively. If all the parameters θ and {µj}
are known, the quickest detection problem in (6) is optimally solved by the well-known CUSUM test
[24]
TC = min
K : max1≤k≤K
K∑
i=k
∑
j∈A
log
P1
(
u
(i)
j |θ, µj
)
P0
(
u
(i)
j |θ
) ≥ h
 , (7)
8where the threshold h is determined by the constraint in (6). For a given K, the value of k which
maximizes the test statistic in (7) can be considered as the estimate of attack time. It is well-known that
the nonlinear accumulation of the log-likelihood ratios in (7) can be written in a recursive way, and hence
can be easily implemented in practice with low complexity [22], [23].
Note that in our attack detection problem, the parameters θ and {µj} are unknown and need to be
estimated, as estimating θ is the essential task of the network. To address this, this paper resort to the
generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) method by replacing the unknown parameters with their maximum
likelihood estimates (MLE) [22], [23].
III. SEQUENTIAL ATTACK DETECTION BASED ON GENERALIZED CUSUM TEST
A. Generalized CUSUM Test
Upon replacing the unknown parameters θ and {µj} with their MLEs, the generalized CUSUM test
can be written as
TG = min
{
K : max
1≤k≤K
Λ
(k,K)
G ≥ h
}
, (8)
where TG is the stopping time corresponding to the generalized CUSUM test, and the statistic Λ
(k,K)
G is
given by
Λ
(k,K)
G
∆
= ln
sup
θ,{µj≥b}
M∏
m=1
∏
j∈N
P0
(
uˇ
(m)
j |θ
) K∏
i=1
∏
j∈S
P0
(
u
(i)
j |θ
) k−1∏
i=1
∏
j∈A
P0
(
u
(i)
j |θ
) K∏
i=k
∏
j∈A
P1
(
u
(i)
j |θ, µj
)
sup
θ
M∏
m=1
∏
j∈N
P0
(
uˇ
(m)
j |θ
) K∏
i=1
∏
j∈N
P0
(
u
(i)
j |θ
)
= sup
θ,{µj≥b}
f1 (θ, {µj})− sup
θ
f0 (θ) (9)
with
f1 (θ, {µj})
∆
=
M∑
m=1
∑
j∈N
lnP0
(
uˇ
(m)
j |θ
)
+
K∑
i=1
∑
j∈S
lnP0
(
u
(i)
j |θ
)
+
k−1∑
i=1
∑
j∈A
lnP0
(
u
(i)
j |θ
)
+
K∑
i=k
∑
j∈A
lnP1
(
u
(i)
j |θ, µj
)
, (10)
f0 (θ)
∆
=
M∑
m=1
∑
j∈N
lnP0
(
uˇ
(m)
j |θ
)
+
K∑
i=1
∑
j∈N
lnP0
(
u
(i)
j |θ
)
. (11)
By defining [
θˆ
(a)
MLE, {µˆ
(j)
MLE}
]
∆
= arg max
θ,{µj≥b}
f1 (θ, {µj}) , (12)
9θˆ
(u)
MLE
∆
= argmax
θ
f0 (θ) , (13)
the statistic Λ
(k,K)
G can be simplified as
Λ
(k,K)
G =
M∑
m=1
∑
j∈N
ln
P0
(
uˇ
(m)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(a)MLE)
P0
(
uˇ
(m)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(u)MLE) +
K∑
i=1
∑
j∈S
ln
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(a)MLE)
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(u)MLE)
+
k−1∑
i=1
∑
j∈A
ln
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(a)MLE)
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(u)MLE) +
K∑
i=k
∑
j∈A
ln
P1
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(a)MLE, µˆ(j)MLE)
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(u)MLE) , (14)
by employing (9), (12) and (13).
It is worth mentioning that the constraint on {µj} as illustrated in (4) is crucial in the generalized
CUSUM test in (8), since the pre-attack model will be subsumed in the post-attack model if the constraint
in (4) is removed. To be specific, in general, in order to guarantee the detectability of the attacks, the
sign of the mean value of the generalized log-likelihood ratio should differ between the pre-attack and
post-attack scenarios [22], [23]. However, if we remove the constraint in (4), we can obtain
Λ
(k,K)
G = sup
θ,{µj}
f1 (θ, {µj})− sup
θ
f0 (θ) ≥ sup
θ
f1 (θ, {0})− sup
θ
f0 (θ) = 0 (15)
by employing (10) and (11). Thus, no matter whether attacks occur or not, the expected value of the test
statistic is always nonnegative, which implies that the attacks are nondetectable.
B. Conditions to Meet Expected False Alarm Period Constraint
Moreover, note that the threshold h in (8) needs to be set to meet the constraint on the expected false
alarm period in (6). However, due to the uncertainty of the pre-attack model and the post-attack model, it
is not clear whether the constraint in (6) can be guaranteed by some h in general. For example, consider
the case where θˆ
(u)
MLE is close to −∞ with high probability. It is seen from (14) that P0(u
(i)
j |θˆ
(u)
MLE) is
close to 0, and hence, Λ
(k,K)
G blows up, which gives rise to TG close to 1 with high probability for any
h. In this case, the constraint in (6) may not be guaranteed. In light of this, we first look into this issue.
Notice that by defining
q (θ)
∆
= P0
(
u
(i)
j = 0 |θ
)
= F (τ − θ) , (16)
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f0(θ) in (11) can be rewritten as
f0 (θ) =
M∑
m=1
∑
j∈N
[(
1− uˇ
(m)
j
)
ln q (θ) + uˇ
(m)
j ln (1− q (θ))
]
+
K∑
i=1
∑
j∈N
[(
1− u
(i)
j
)
ln q (θ) + u
(i)
j ln (1− q (θ))
]
, (17)
which yields
∂f0 (θ)
∂θ
=

M∑
m=1
∑
j∈N
1− q (θ)− uˇ
(m)
j
q (θ) [1− q (θ)]
+
K∑
i=1
∑
j∈N
1− q (θ)− u
(i)
j
q (θ) [1− q (θ)]
 ∂q (θ)∂θ . (18)
By the definition of θˆ
(u)
MLE in (13), we know that θˆ
(u)
MLE is a solution to
∂f0(θ)
∂θ
= 0, and hence, we can
obtain
θˆ
(u)
MLE = τ − F
−1
1− 1
(M +K)N
∑
j∈N
(
M∑
m=1
uˇ
(m)
j +
K∑
i=1
u
(i)
j
) (19)
by employing (16) and (18). In the following, we provide a theorem regarding the false alarm period.
Theorem 1. With sufficiently large M or N , the false alarm period can be set to be arbitrarily large
with any high probability by properly choosing h. In particular,
lim
M orN→∞
P0
(
lim
h→∞
TG =∞
∣∣∣∣ θ) = 1. (20)
Proof: By employing (19), we can obtain
F
(
τ − θˆ
(u)
MLE
)
= 1−
1
(M +K)N
∑
j∈N
(
M∑
m=1
u
(m)
j +
K∑
i=1
u
(i)
j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
=S
(21)
Denote
ǫ1
∆
=
1
2
(1− q (θ)) > 0 and ǫ2
∆
=
1
2
q (θ) > 0. (22)
Now, we consider the probabilities P0 (S ≥ 1− q (θ) + ǫ2|θ ) and P0 (S ≤ 1− q (θ)− ǫ1|θ ).
Note that
P0 (S ≥ 1− q (θ) + ǫ2 |θ )
= P0
 1
(M +K)N
∑
j∈N
(
M∑
m=1
(
uˇ
(m)
j − 1 + q (θ)
)
+
K∑
i=1
(
u
(i)
j − 1 + q (θ)
))
≥ ǫ2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ θ

= P0
 1
(M +K)N
(M+K)N∑
i=1
Xi ≥ ǫ2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ θ
 , (23)
11
where {Xi} is a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables with distribution
P0 (Xi = q (θ)− 1 |θ ) = q (θ) (24)
and
P0 (Xi = q (θ) |θ ) = 1− q (θ) . (25)
Since ǫ2 > E0(Xi) = 0, by the large deviations theory [42], we can obtain
P0
 1
(M +K)N
(M+K)N∑
i=1
Xi ≥ ǫ2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ θ
 ≤ e−υ(1)θ (M+K)N , (26)
where the rate function υ
(1)
θ is given by
υ
(1)
θ
∆
= − lim
(M+K)N→∞
1
(M +K)N
lnP0
 (M+K)N∑
i=1
Xi ≥ ǫ2 (M +K)N
∣∣∣∣∣∣ θ

= ǫ2c
∗ − lnϕX (c
∗) (27)
and the function ϕX (c) is defined as
ϕX (c)
∆
= E0
(
ecXi
)
= q (θ) ec[q(θ)−1] + [1− q (θ)] ecq(θ). (28)
The quantity c∗ in (27) is the positive solution to
d
dc
ϕX (c) + ǫ2ϕX (c) = 0. (29)
By employing (22), (24), (25), (27), (28) and (29), the rate function υ
(1)
θ can be obtained as
υ
(1)
θ = [ǫ2 − q (θ)] ln
q (θ) [1− q (θ) + ǫ2]
[q (θ)− ǫ2] [1− q (θ)]
− ln
1− q (θ)
1− q (θ) + ǫ2
=
[
1−
1
2
q (θ)
]
ln
2− q (θ)
1− q (θ)
− ln 2 > 0. (30)
On the other hand, P0 (S ≤ 1− q (θ)− ǫ1|θ ) can be rewritten as
P0 (S ≤ 1− q (θ)− ǫ1 |θ )
= P0
 1
(M +K)N
∑
j∈N
(
M∑
m=1
(
1− q (θ)− uˇ
(m)
j
)
+
K∑
i=1
(
1− q (θ)− u
(i)
j
))
≥ ǫ1 |θ

= P0
 1
(M +K)N
(M+K)N∑
i=1
Yi ≥ ǫ1 |θ
 , (31)
where {Yi} is a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables with distribution
P0 (Yi = 1− q (θ) |θ ) = q (θ) (32)
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and
P0 (Yi = −q (θ) |θ ) = 1− q (θ) . (33)
Similarly, we can obtain
P0 (S ≤ 1− q (θ)− ǫ1 |θ ) ≤ e
−υ(2)θ (M+K)N , (34)
where the rate function υ
(2)
θ is given by
υ
(2)
θ =
1
2
[1 + q (θ)] ln
1 + q (θ)
q (θ)
− ln 2 > 0. (35)
From (23), (26) and (34), it is clear that
P0 (S ∈ (1− q (θ)− ǫ1, 1− q (θ) + ǫ2) |θ )
= 1−P0 (S ≤ 1− q (θ)− ǫ1 |θ )−P0 (S ≥ 1− q (θ) + ǫ2 |θ )
≥ 1− e−υ
(1)
θ (M+K)N − e−υ
(2)
θ (M+K)N
≥ 1− 2e−υ
∗
θ (M+K)N , (36)
where υ∗θ is defined as
υ∗θ , min{υ
(1)
θ , υ
(2)
θ } > 0. (37)
Define
ǫ∗
∆
= min {ǫ1, ǫ2} =
1
2
min {q (θ) , 1− q (θ)} > 0. (38)
Note that if S ∈ (1− q (θ)− ǫ1, 1− q (θ) + ǫ2), then by the definition of S in (21), we have
F
(
τ − θˆ
(u)
MLE
)
= 1− S ≥ q (θ)− ǫ2 =
1
2
q (θ) ≥ ǫ∗, (39)
1− F
(
τ − θˆ
(u)
MLE
)
= S ≥ 1− q (θ)− ǫ1 =
1
2
[1− q (θ)] ≥ ǫ∗, (40)
which yields
Fmin
∆
= min
{
F
(
τ − θˆ
(u)
MLE
)
, 1− F
(
τ − θˆ
(u)
MLE
)}
≥ ǫ∗. (41)
Moreover, if S ∈ (1− q (θ)− ǫ1, 1− q (θ) + ǫ2), then by employing (41), we can obtain
P0
(
u
∣∣∣θˆ(u)MLE) = (1− u)F (τ − θˆ(u)MLE)+ u [1− F (τ − θˆ(u)MLE)] ≥ Fmin ≥ ǫ∗ > 0, ∀u = 0, 1, (42)
which implies that for any uˇ
(m)
j , u
(i)
j , θˆ
(u)
MLE, θˆ
(a)
MLE and µˆ
(j)
MLE,
ln
P0
(
uˇ
(m)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(a)MLE)
P0
(
uˇ
(m)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(u)MLE) , ln
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(a)MLE)
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(u)MLE) , ln
P1
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(a)MLE, µˆ(j)MLE)
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(u)MLE) ≤ − ln ǫ∗, (43)
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and therefore, by employing (14), we can obtain
Λ
(k,K)
G ≤ − (M +K)N ln ǫ
∗. (44)
Note that for any given M , N and h, if (44) holds and the stopping criterion in (8) is triggered, then
TG = K and
− (M + TG)N ln ǫ
∗ ≥ max
1≤k≤K
Λ
(k,K)
G ≥ h, (45)
which implies
TG ≥ −
h
N ln ǫ∗
−M. (46)
In consequence, for any given M , N and h, we have
P0
(
TG ≥ −
h
N ln ǫ∗
−M
∣∣∣∣ θ)
≥ P0 (S ∈ (1− q (θ)− ǫ1, 1− q (θ) + ǫ2) |θ )
≥ 1− 2e−υ
∗
θ (M+TG)N
≥ 1− 2e−υ
∗
θMN , (47)
which yields that for any given θ,
lim
M orN→∞
P0
(
lim
h→∞
TG =∞
∣∣∣∣ θ) = 1. (48)
From (47), we know that with sufficiently large M or N , if there is no occurrence of attacks, the stopping
time TG in (6) can be set to be arbitrarily large with any high probability by properly choosing h.
Next, we provide another theorem regarding the constraint on the expected false alarm period in (6).
Theorem 2. If MN is large enough such that
MN >
ln 2
υ∗θ
(49)
where υ∗θ is defined in (37), then E∞ {TG} ≥ κ as long as
h ≥ N
(
κ
1− 2e−υ
∗
θMN
+M
)
ln
1
ǫ∗
, (50)
where ǫ∗ is defined in (38).
Proof: If MN > ln 2
υ∗θ
, then we know that
1− 2e−υ
∗
θMN > 0. (51)
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Since TG is a non-negative random variable, the expected false alarm period can be bounded from below
as per
E∞ {TG} =
∫ ∞
0
P0 (TG ≥ x |θ ) dx
≥
∫ − h
N ln ǫ∗
−M
0
P0 (TG ≥ x |θ ) dx
≥ P0
(
TG ≥ −
h
N ln ǫ∗
−M
∣∣∣∣ θ)∫ − hN ln ǫ∗−M
0
dx
≥
(
1− 2e−υ
∗
θMN
)(
−
h
N ln ǫ∗
−M
)
≥ κ (52)
by employing (47) and (50), which completes the proof.
As demonstrated by Theorem 1, in the considered attack detection problem, if the length of secure
time M or the number of sensors N is large enough, the false alarm period can be guaranteed to be
arbitrarily large with any high probability by choosing a large h. A larger false alarm period is always
desirable, hence the system would better maintain secure for a sufficiently large M prior to the inference
task. Moreover, Theorem 2 illustrates that in order to guarantee the expected false alarm period to be
larger than the prescribed threshold κ in (6), the product of M and N should be larger than the critical
quantity ln 2
υ∗θ
. However, as shown in (27), (35) and (37), this critical quantity depends on θ which is
unknown to the system, and therefore, to guarantee the condition in (49), the system should be secured
for a sufficiently long time in advance, i.e., M should be sufficiently large. In light of these, in the
following, we will be primarily interested in the case where M is sufficiently large.
C. Approximate Maximum Likelihood Estimates
By employing (10), (12) and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions [43], θˆ
(a)
MLE and µˆ
(j)
MLE are the solutions
to 
∂f1 (θ, {µj})
∂θ
= 0, (53)
∂f1 (θ, {µj})
∂µj
+ cj = 0, (54)
cj (b− µj) = 0, (55)
cj ≥ 0, (56)
µj ≥ b, (57)
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where f1 (θ, {µj}) is defined in (10). By defining
q˜ (θ, µj)
∆
= F (τ − θ − µj) , (58)
∂f1(θ,{µj})
∂µj
and
∂f1(θ,{µj})
∂θ
can be analytically expressed as
∂f1 (θ, {µj})
∂µj
=
∂q˜ (θ, µj)
∂µj
K∑
i=k
1− q˜ (θ, µj)− u
(i)
j
q˜ (θ, µj) [1− q˜ (θ, µj)]
, (59)
∂f1 (θ, {µj})
∂θ
=
∂q (θ)
∂θ
{
M∑
m=1
∑
j∈N
1− q (θ)− uˇ
(m)
j
q (θ) [1− q (θ)]
+
K∑
i=1
∑
j∈S
1− q (θ)− u
(i)
j
q (θ) [1− q (θ)]
+
k−1∑
i=1
∑
j∈A
1− q (θ)− u
(i)
j
q (θ) [1− q (θ)]
}
+
∂q˜ (θ, µj)
∂θ
K∑
i=k
∑
j∈A
1− q˜ (θ, µj)− u
(i)
j
q˜ (θ, µj) [1− q˜ (θ, µj)]
, (60)
where q(θ) is defined in (16). By employing (54)–(57) and (59), we can obtain
µˆ
(j)
MLE = max {µ˜j, b} , (61)
where µ˜j is defined as
µ˜j
∆
= τ − θˆ
(a)
MLE − F
−1
[
1−
1
K − k + 1
K∑
i=k
u
(i)
j
]
. (62)
It is worth mentioning that µˆ
(j)
MLE and θˆ
(a)
MLE can only be numerically obtained by using (53), (60), (61)
and (62). Next, we propose to employ the closed-form approximations to µˆ
(j)
MLE and θˆ
(a)
MLE. In particular,
we employ θˆ(a) as a substitute for θˆ
(a)
MLE, which is defined as
θˆ(a)
∆
= τ − F−1
1− 1
MN +KNS
∑
j∈N
M∑
m=1
uˇ
(m)
j +
∑
j∈S
K∑
i=1
u
(i)
j
 . (63)
The motivation for θˆ(a) in (63) is from the fact that in the asymptotic regimes where M → ∞ or
K →∞, from (63), we know
θˆ(a) → θ almost surely (a.s.), (64)
by the strong law of large numbers. As stated before, we are primarily interested in the scenario where
the system is secured for a sufficiently long time at the beginning, i.e., M is sufficiently large, thus the
estimate θˆ(a) converges to the true value of the unknown parameter in the scenario of interest. Moreover,
with a sufficiently large number of observations, θˆ
(a)
MLE is also expected to get close to the true value. To
this end, θˆ(a) must be close to θˆ
(a)
MLE in the scenario of interest, and hence, is a good substitute for θˆ
(a)
MLE
which cannot be analytically expressed.
16
By employing (62) and (63), the corresponding µ˜j can be expressed as
µ˜j ≈ F
−1
[
1−
1
MN +KNS
(∑
l∈N
M∑
m=1
uˇ
(m)
l +
∑
l∈S
K∑
i=1
u
(i)
l
)]
− F−1
[
1−
1
K − k + 1
K∑
i=k
u
(i)
j
]
, (65)
and Λ
(k,K)
G can be rewritten as
Λ
(k,K)
G ≈
M∑
m=1
∑
j∈N
ln
P0
(
uˇ
(m)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(a))
P0
(
uˇ
(m)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(u)MLE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
=φ(1)jm
+
K∑
i=1
∑
j∈S
ln
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(a))
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(u)MLE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
=φ(2)ji
+
k−1∑
i=1
∑
j∈A
ln
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(a))
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(u)MLE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
=φ
(3)
ji
+
K∑
i=k
∑
j∈A
ln
P1
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(a), µˆj )
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(u)MLE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
=φ
(4)
ji
, (66)
where θˆ
(u)
MLE is given by (19) and µˆj
∆
= max {µ˜j, b}.
It is worth pointing out that the estimators θˆ(a), θˆ
(u)
MLE and µˆj need to be recalculated for different
k or K, which results in a very high computational complexity in obtaining TG in (8). Moreover, it is
seen from (8) that since the test statistic of generalized CUSUM can not be calculated in a recursive
way, the computation of the test statistic of the generalized CUSUM requires an exhaustive search over
k for each K which is considered as computationally prohibitive in practice, especially when h is large.
To this end, the generalized CUSUM test in (8) is not amenable to implementation in practice even if
centralized processing is allowed, which motives us to pursue more practical algorithms in the following.
The test statistic of the generalized CUSUM in (66) deserves some discussion. It is seen from (66)
that the first two terms in the sum coming from the secure data which is due to the existence of unknown
parameters in both the pre-attack and post-attack models. This implies that in the presence of the unknown
parameters in both the pre-attack and post-attack models, the secure data also conveys some information
on the attacks, which is not observed in the test statistic of CUSUM in (7). In addition, if θ is known,
then it is clear that the first three terms in (66) varnish, which greatly simplifies the expression of the test
statistic in (66). Therefore, the presence of unknown parameters in both the pre-attack and post-attack
models renders the attack detection problem more difficult.
IV. CONSENSUS-BASED DISTRIBUTED SEQUENTIAL ATTACK DETECTION
In the previous section, the generalized CUSUM detector is investigated. It is seen from (8), (19), (61),
(63) and (66) that all the quantized sensor data in the network is required to be synchronously collected
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and processed at each time at a single place which plays the role of the fusion center. This brings about a
significant communication overhead in large-scale spatially distributed sensor networks. More importantly,
as mentioned before, the generalized CUSUM is computationally prohibitive in practice. In light of this,
we proceed to propose a distributed sequential attack detector based on the generalized CUSUM test,
which only requires communications between closely positioned sensors and is amenable to implementa-
tion in practice. The resulting distributed detector remarkably decreases the long-distance communication
overhead and reduces the computational complexity, yet preserves high detection performance.
A. Asymptotically Equivalent Alternative Test Statistic
For each given K, the test statistic max1≤k≤KΛ
(k,K)
G of the generalized CUSUM test can be rewritten
as
H
(G)
K,M
∆
= max
1≤k≤K
Λ
(k,K)
G =
M∑
m=1
∑
j∈N
φ
(1)
jm︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
=η(1)K,M
+
K∑
i=1
∑
j∈S
φ
(2)
ji︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
=η(2)K,M
+ max
1≤k≤K
{
k−1∑
i=1
∑
j∈A
φ
(3)
ji︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
=η(3)K,M
+
K∑
i=k
∑
j∈A
φ
(4)
ji︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
=η(4)K,M
}
(67)
by employing (8) and (66). In this subsection, in order to facilitate the distributed implementation of
the generalized CUSUM test in (8) later, we first propose an alternative test statistic as a substitute for
H
(G)
K,M , which is equivalent to H
(G)
K,M in the asymptotic regime of interest where M is sufficiently large.
It is worth mentioning that although the term η
(3)
K,M in (67) is the log-likelihood ratio of the quantized
data from A up to time k ≤ K, it is adapted to the filtration FK generated by all quantized data from
all sensors up to time K, since k is adapted to the filtration FK . Therefore, the computation of η
(3)
K,M
requires all quantized data from all sensors up to time K, which hinders us from computing H
(G)
K,M in
a distributed and efficient way. In light of this, a straightforward idea is to get rid of η
(3)
K,M in (67) to
facilitate the distributed computation of the test statistic, which yields an alternative test statistic given
by
H
(A)
K,M
∆
= η
(1)
K,M + η
(2)
K,M + max1≤k≤K
η
(4)
K,M . (68)
The following theorem describes the relationship between H
(A)
K,M and H
(G)
K,M .
Theorem 3. In the asymptotic regime where M →∞, for any given K <∞, we have
lim
M→∞
∣∣∣H(A)K,M −H(G)K,M ∣∣∣ = 0 a.s. (69)
no matter whether attacks occur or not.
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Proof: From (67) and (68), we can obtain
lim
M→∞
∣∣∣H(A)K,M −H(G)K,M ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ limM→∞ max1≤k≤K {η(3)K,M + η(4)K,M}− limM→∞ max1≤k≤K η(4)K,M
∣∣∣∣ . (70)
First, we claim that we can switch the orders of the limit operation and the max operation for the first
term on the right-hand side in (70). This claim can be proved as follows.
For any two random variables XM and YM ,
max {XM , YM} =
1
2
(XM + YM + |XM − YM |) (71)
which is a continuous function of XM and YM , and therefore,
lim
M→∞
max {XM , YM} = max
{
lim
M→∞
XM , lim
M→∞
YM
}
. (72)
By induction, for any given K <∞, we know
lim
M→∞
max
1≤k≤K
{
η
(3)
K,M + η
(4)
K,M
}
= max
1≤k≤K
{
lim
M→∞
η
(3)
K,M + lim
M→∞
η
(4)
K,M
}
(73)
which yields
lim
M→∞
∣∣∣H(A)K,M −H(G)K,M ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ max1≤k≤K
{
lim
M→∞
η
(3)
K,M + lim
M→∞
η
(4)
K,M
}
− lim
M→∞
max
1≤k≤K
η
(4)
K,M
∣∣∣∣ . (74)
By employing the definition of φ
(3)
ji in (66), we can obtain
φ
(3)
ji = ln
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(a))
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(u)MLE) =
(
1− u
(i)
j
)
ln
F
(
τ − θˆ(a)
)
F
(
τ − θˆ
(u)
MLE
) + u(i)j ln 1− F
(
τ − θˆ(a)
)
1− F
(
τ − θˆ
(u)
MLE
) , (75)
which implies ∣∣∣η(3)K,M ∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
k−1∑
i=1
∑
j∈A
φ
(3)
ji
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ (k − 1)NA
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln
F
(
τ − θˆ(a)
)
F
(
τ − θˆ
(u)
MLE
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln
1− F
(
τ − θˆ(a)
)
1− F
(
τ − θˆ
(u)
MLE
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣

≤ KN
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln
F
(
τ − θˆ(a)
)
F
(
τ − θˆ
(u)
MLE
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln
1− F
(
τ − θˆ(a)
)
1− F
(
τ − θˆ
(u)
MLE
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 . (76)
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Furthermore, notice that for any given K ≤ ∞,
lim
M→∞
ln
F
(
τ − θˆ(a)
)
F
(
τ − θˆ
(u)
MLE
) = ln 1− limM→∞
1
MN+KNS
(∑
j∈N
M∑
m=1
uˇ
(m)
j +
∑
j∈S
K∑
i=1
u
(i)
j
)
1− lim
M→∞
1
(M+K)N
∑
j∈N
(
M∑
m=1
u
(m)
j +
K∑
i=1
u
(i)
j
)
= ln
F (τ − θ)
F (τ − θ)
, a.s. (77)
= 0, (78)
lim
M→∞
ln
1− F
(
τ − θˆ(a)
)
1− F
(
τ − θˆ
(u)
MLE
) = ln limM→∞
1
MN+KNS
(∑
j∈N
M∑
m=1
uˇ
(m)
j +
∑
j∈S
K∑
i=1
u
(i)
j
)
lim
M→∞
1
(M+K)N
∑
j∈N
(
M∑
m=1
u
(m)
j +
K∑
i=1
u
(i)
j
)
= ln
1− F (τ − θ)
1− F (τ − θ)
, a.s. (79)
= 0, (80)
where (77) and (79) are from the strong law of large numbers that
lim
M→∞
1
MN
∑
j∈N
M∑
m=1
uˇ
(m)
j = 1− F (τ − θ) , a.s.. (81)
By employing (76), (78) and (80), we can obtain
lim
M→∞
∣∣∣η(3)K,M ∣∣∣ = 0, a.s.. (82)
As a result, from (74), we know that for any given K ≤ ∞
lim
M→∞
∣∣∣H(A)K,M −H(G)K,M ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ max1≤k≤K
{
lim
M→∞
η
(3)
K,M + lim
M→∞
η
(4)
K,M
}
− lim
M→∞
max
1≤k≤K
η
(4)
K,M
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ max1≤k≤K limM→∞ η(4)K,M − limM→∞ max1≤k≤K η(4)K,M
∣∣∣∣ , a.s.
=
∣∣∣∣ limM→∞ max1≤k≤K η(4)K,M − limM→∞ max1≤k≤K η(4)K,M
∣∣∣∣
= 0, (83)
which completes the proof.
As demonstrated by Theorem 3, if K is finite, then the alternative test statistic H
(A)
K,M is asymptotically
equivalent to the test statistic H
(G)
K,M when M is sufficiently large. It is worth mentioning that in general,
if h in (8) is finite, then TG <∞ with probability one, which implies K <∞ since K ≤ TG. To this end,
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in the asymptotic regime where M → ∞, we can employ the following test instead of the generalized
CUSUM test in (8)
TA = min
{
K : H
(A)
K,M ≥ h
}
. (84)
Noticing from (68), the test statisticH
(A)
K,M consists of three terms, that is, η
(1)
K,M , η
(2)
K,M andmax1≤k≤K η
(4)
K,M .
The terms η
(1)
K,M and η
(2)
K,M come from the information on attacks conveyed in the secure data, while
max1≤k≤K η
(4)
K,M is contributed by the insecure data. In the following subsections, we will illustrate
how to compute these three terms in a distributed way by employing running consensus algorithms,
respectively.
B. Local Estimators Based on Running Consensus Algorithms
In this subsection, we consider the distributed computation of certain statistics based on the commu-
nication protocol known as the running consensus algorithm, in which the sensors exchange their local
statistics instead of the raw samples between every two sampling instants. Moreover, we assume that
Q ≥ 1 rounds of message-passings can take place within each sampling interval.
Let us first consider the statistics in η
(1)
K,M in (67). From (19), (63), (66) and (67), η
(1)
K,M can be rewritten
as
η
(1)
K,M = (MN − λM)G
(1)
K,M + λMG
(2)
K,M , (85)
where
G
(1)
K,M
∆
= ln
1− 1
MN+KNS
(λM + λS)
1− 1
MN+KN (λM + λN )
, G
(2)
K,M
∆
= ln
1
MN+KNS
(λM + λS)
1
MN+KN (λM + λN )
, (86)
λM ,
∑
j∈N
M∑
m=1
uˇ
(m)
j , λN ,
∑
j∈N
K∑
i=1
u
(i)
j and λS ,
∑
j∈S
K∑
i=1
u
(i)
j . (87)
It is seen from (85) that η
(1)
K,M is determined by the statistics λM, λN and λS . Thus, if each sensor is
able to obtain the values of λM, λN and λS , then it can produce η
(1)
K,M . Similarly, by employing (19),
(63), (66) and (67), η
(2)
K,M can be written as
η
(2)
K,M = (KNS − λS)G
(1)
K,M + λSG
(2)
K,M , (88)
which is fully determined by λM, λN and λS . Moreover, as shown later, max1≤k≤Kη
(4)
K,M also depends
on the statistics λM, λN and λS . To this end, we consider the distributed computation of λM, λN and
λS in the remainder of this subsection.
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For the sake of notational simplicity, we first put the quantized data {uˇ
(m)
j }, {u
(i)
j } in three vectors,
that is, let γˇ(l) = [γˇ
(l)
1 , γˇ
(l)
2 , ..., γˇ
(l)
N ]
T , γ(l) = [γ
(l)
1 , γ
(l)
2 , ..., γ
(l)
N ]
T and γ˜(l) = [γ˜
(l)
1 , γ˜
(l)
2 , ..., γ˜
(l)
N ]
T denote
the observation vectors at time l, where
γˇ
(l)
j ,
 uˇ
(l)
j , if 1 ≤ l ≤M,
0, if l ≥M + 1,
(89)
γ
(l)
j ,
 0, if 1 ≤ l ≤M,u(l)j , if l ≥M + 1, (90)
γ˜
(l)
j ,
 u
(l)
j , if l ≥M + 1 and j ∈ S,
0, otherwise.
(91)
Based on γˇ(l), γ(l) and γ˜(l), we can employ running consensus algorithms to obtain three local statistics
at each sensor which will be utilized to produce local estimates of λM, λN and λS later. Specifically, let
Γˇ
(l), Γ(l) and Γ˜(l) denote three statistic vectors at time l, where the j-th element of each statistic vector
denotes a local statistic at the j-th sensor at time l, respectively. We set Γˇ(0) = Γ(0) = Γ˜(0) = 0. Within
the l-th sampling interval, the running-consensus-algorithm-based computation is carried out as follows:
1) Take a new sample at each sensor at time instant l, and add it to the statistic vectors from previous
time as follows:
Γˇ
(l,0) = Γˇ(l−1) + γˇ(l), Γ(l,0) = Γ(l−1) + γ(l), and Γ˜(l,0) = Γ˜(l−1) + γ˜(l). (92)
2) For n = 1, 2, ..., Q, every sensor exchanges its local intermediate statistics Γˇ(l,n), Γ(l,n) and Γ˜(l,n)
with its neighboring sensors, and updates the local intermediate statistics as the weighted sum of the
available statistics from the neighboring sensors, i.e., for n = 1, 2, ..., Q and ∀j ∈ N ,(
Γˇ
(l,n)
)
j
= wˇjj
(
Γˇ
(l,n−1)
)
j
+
∑
i∈Nj
wˇij
(
Γˇ
(l,n−1)
)
i
, (93)
(
Γ
(l,n)
)
j
= wjj
(
Γ
(l,n−1)
)
j
+
∑
i∈Nj
wij
(
Γ
(l,n−1)
)
i
, (94)
(
Γ˜
(l,n)
)
j
= w˜jj
(
Γ˜
(l,n−1)
)
j
+
∑
i∈Nj
w˜ij
(
Γ˜
(l,n−1)
)
i
, (95)
where Nj denotes the set of indices of the j-th sensor’s neighbors and the weight coefficients {wˇij},
{wij} and {w˜ij} will be specified later. The notation (·)j in (93)–(95) denotes the j-th element of
the corresponding vector.
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3) Update the local statistics for time l as
Γˇ
(l) = Γˇ(l,Q), Γ(l) = Γ(l,Q) and Γ˜(l) = Γ˜(l,Q). (96)
4) Go to Step 1) for the next sampling interval l + 1.
From (93)–(95), we can express each message-passing in a compact matrix form as
Γˇ
(l,n) = WˇΓˇ(l,n−1), Γ(l,n) =WΓ(l,n−1) and Γ˜(l,n) = W˜Γ˜(l,n−1), for n = 1, 2, .., Q, (97)
where the matrices Wˇ , (wˇij) ∈ R
N×N ,W , (wij) ∈ R
N×N and W˜ , (w˜ij) ∈ R
N×N are formed by
wˇij , wij and w˜ij defined in (93)–(95), respectively. Combining (92) and (97), we know that the statistic
vectors evolve over time according to
Γˇ
(l)=WˇQ
(
Γˇ
(l−1) + γˇ(l)
)
, Γ(l)=WQ
(
Γ
(l−1) + γ(l)
)
and Γ˜(l)=W˜Q
(
Γ˜
(l−1) + γ˜(l)
)
,∀l ≥ 1. (98)
From (98), the statistic vectors at time L ≥ 1 can also be equivalently expressed as
Γˇ
(L) =
L∑
l=1
Wˇ
Q(L−l+1)γˇ(l), Γ(L) =
L∑
l=1
W
Q(L−l+1)γ(l) and Γ˜(L) =
L∑
l=1
W˜
Q(L−l+1)γ˜(l). (99)
Note that (99) resembles the consensus algorithm in the fixed-sample-size test where there is no
innovation, i.e., γˇ(l) = γ(l) = γ˜(l) = 0 for l is larger than some L. In that case, under certain regularity
conditions on Wˇ, W and W˜, consensus can be reached in the sense that the elements in Γˇ(l), Γ(l) or
Γ˜
(l) converge to the same values as l → ∞, respectively. In contrast, with the new samples constantly
arriving in the running consensus algorithm described in (92)–(99), the elements in Γˇ(l), Γ(l) or Γ˜(l)
cannot respectively reach consensus as l→∞. However, we will show later that even though consensus
cannot be reached as l →∞, we still can employ Γˇ(l), Γ(l) and Γ˜(l) to construct local estimators of λM,
λN and λS at each sensor with bounded estimation errors, respectively.
Before proceeding, we first impose the following condition on the weight matrices Wˇ, W and W˜.
Condition 1. For the weight matrix W ∈ {Wˇ,W,W˜}, it satisfies
1
T
W = 1T , W1 = 1 and 0 < σ2 (W) < 1, (100)
where 1 is the all-one vector and σi(W) denotes the i-th largest singular value of W.
The condition essentially regulates the elements in the matrix. If we further require that every element
in the matrix is non-negative, then Condition 1 is equivalent to W being doubly stochastic.
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Based on the statistic vectors Γˇ(l), Γ(l) and Γ˜(l), for each j = 1, 2, ..., N , we consider the following
estimators of the statistics λM, λN and λS , respectively
λˆ
(K)
M,j
∆
= NeTj Γˇ
(M+K), λˆ
(K)
N ,j
∆
= NeTj Γ
(M+K) and λˆ
(K)
S,j
∆
= NeTj Γ˜
(M+K), (101)
where ej
∆
= [0, ..., 0, 1︸︷︷︸
the j-th element
, 0, ..., 0]T . It is worth mentioning that λˆ
(K)
M,j , λˆ
(K)
N ,j and λˆ
(K)
S,j only employ
the local statistics at the j-th sensor, and therefore, can be locally obtained at each sensor. Regarding the
estimation performance of λˆ
(K)
M,j , λˆ
(K)
N ,j and λˆ
(K)
S,j , we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For any given K, M and j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, we have∣∣∣λˆ(K)M,j − λM∣∣∣ ≤ N 32
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q , (102)
∣∣∣λˆ(K)N ,j − λN ∣∣∣ ≤ N 32 [σ2 (W)]Q
1− [σ2 (W)]
Q
, (103)
∣∣∣λˆ(K)S,j − λS ∣∣∣ ≤ N 32
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
1−
[
σ2(W˜)
]Q . (104)
Proof: Refer to Appendix A.
From the definitions of λM, λN and λS in (87), we know that the computation of these statistics
require an FC to collect all quantized data from all sensors. However, Lemma 1 illustrates that just
by employing local communications between neighboring sensors, each sensor can individually produce
some local estimators which approximate λM, λN and λS very well, since the estimation errors can
be bounded from above. Moreover, since 0 < σ2(Wˇ), σ2(W), σ2(W˜) < 1, the upper bounds on the
estimation errors decrease to 0 as Q grows to infinity, which implies that these local estimates λˆ
(K)
M,j ,
λˆ
(K)
N ,j and λˆ
(K)
S,j can be sufficiently accurate for every j provided that Q is sufficiently large.
C. Distributed Computation of η
(1)
K,M and η
(2)
K,M
By utilizing the local estimators λˆ
(K)
M,j , λˆ
(K)
N ,j and λˆ
(K)
S,j , we define the local estimators of η
(1)
K,M and
η
(2)
K,M at the j-th sensor as
ηˆ
(1)
K,M,j
∆
=
(
MN − λˆ
(K)
M,j
)
Gˆ
(j,1)
K,M + λˆ
(K)
M,jGˆ
(j,2)
K,M , (105)
ηˆ
(2)
K,M,j
∆
=
(
KNS − λˆ
(K)
S,j
)
Gˆ
(j,1)
K,M + λˆ
(K)
S,j Gˆ
(j,2)
K,M , (106)
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respectively, where
Gˆ
(j,1)
K,M
∆
= ln
1− 1
MN+KNS
(
λˆ
(K)
M,j + λˆ
(K)
S,j
)
1− 1
MN+KN
(
λˆ
(K)
M,j + λˆ
(K)
N ,j
) and Gˆ(j,2)K,M ∆= ln 1MN+KNS
(
λˆ
(K)
M,j + λˆ
(K)
S,j
)
1
MN+KN
(
λˆ
(K)
M,j + λˆ
(K)
N ,j
) . (107)
Regarding the asymptotic performance of the estimators ηˆ
(1)
K,M,j and ηˆ
(2)
K,M,j, we provide the following
theorem.
Theorem 4. In the asymptotic regime where M →∞, for any given K <∞ and any sensor j, we have
lim
M→∞
∣∣∣ηˆ(1)K,M,j − η(1)K,M ∣∣∣ ≤ N2 [2− q (θ)]q (θ) [1− q (θ)]
(
2
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q +
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
+
[σ2 (W)]
Q
1− [σ2 (W)]
Q
)
a.s. (108)
and
lim
M→∞
∣∣∣ηˆ(2)K,M,j − η(2)K,M ∣∣∣ = 0, a.s.. (109)
Proof: From (85) and (105), we can obtain∣∣∣ηˆ(1)K,M,j − η(1)K,M ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣(MN − λˆ(K)M,j) Gˆ(j,1)K,M + λˆ(K)M,jGˆ(j,2)K,M − (MN − λM)G(1)K,M − λMG(2)K,M ∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣(MN − λˆ(K)M,j) Gˆ(j,1)K,M − (MN − λM)G(1)K,M ∣∣∣+∣∣∣λˆ(K)M,jGˆ(j,2)K,M − λMG(2)K,M ∣∣∣ . (110)
Regarding the first term in (110), we have∣∣∣(MN − λˆ(K)M,j) Gˆ(j,1)K,M − (MN − λM)G(1)K,M ∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣(MN − λˆ(K)M,j) Gˆ(j,1)K,M − (MN − λˆ(K)M,j)G(1)K,M + (MN − λˆ(K)M,j)G(1)K,M − (MN − λM)G(1)K,M ∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣(MN − λˆ(K)M,j) Gˆ(j,1)K,M − (MN − λˆ(K)M,j)G(1)K,M ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣(MN − λˆ(K)M,j)G(1)K,M − (MN − λM)G(1)K,M ∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣MN − λˆ(K)M,j∣∣∣ ∣∣∣Gˆ(j,1)K,M −G(1)K,M ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣λˆ(K)M,j − λM∣∣∣ ∣∣∣G(1)K,M ∣∣∣ . (111)
Similarly, the second term in (110) can be bounded from above as per∣∣∣λˆ(K)M,jGˆ(j,2)K,M − λMG(2)K,M ∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣λˆ(K)M,j∣∣∣ ∣∣∣Gˆ(j,2)K,M −G(2)K,M ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣λˆ(K)M,j − λM∣∣∣ ∣∣∣G(2)K,M ∣∣∣ . (112)
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From (99) and the definition of λˆ
(K)
M,j in (101), we know that∣∣∣λˆ(K)M,j∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣NeTj Γˇ(M+K)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣NeTj
M+K∑
l=1
Wˇ
Q(M+K−l+1)γˇ(l)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ N‖ej‖2
∥∥∥∥∥WˇQK
M∑
l=1
Wˇ
Q(M−l+1)γˇ(l)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(113)
≤ N
M∑
l=1
∥∥∥WˇQ(M−l+1)γˇ(l)∥∥∥
2
(114)
≤MN
3
2 , (115)
which implies ∣∣∣MN − λˆ(K)M,j∣∣∣ ≤MN + ∣∣∣λˆ(K)M,j∣∣∣ ≤ 2MN 32 . (116)
The inequality in (113) is due to the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and (89). The inequalities in (114) and
(115) are from the fact that |γ
(l)
j | ≤ 1 and Condition 1 implies σ1(Wˇ) = 1.
By employing (110), (111), (112), (115), (116) and Lemma 1, we can obtain∣∣∣ηˆ(1)K,M,j − η(1)K,M ∣∣∣ ≤2MN 32 ∣∣∣Gˆ(j,1)K,M −G(1)K,M ∣∣∣+MN 32 ∣∣∣Gˆ(j,2)K,M −G(2)K,M ∣∣∣
+N
3
2
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q (∣∣∣G(1)K,M ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣G(2)K,M ∣∣∣) , (117)
which implies
lim
M→∞
∣∣∣ηˆ(1)K,M,j − η(1)K,M ∣∣∣ ≤ N 32 lim
M→∞
M
(
2
∣∣∣Gˆ(j,1)K,M −G(1)K,M ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣Gˆ(j,2)K,M −G(2)K,M ∣∣∣)+
N
3
2
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q ( limM→∞ ∣∣∣G(1)K,M ∣∣∣+ limM→∞ ∣∣∣G(2)K,M ∣∣∣
)
. (118)
We first consider the term |Gˆ
(j,1)
K,M −G
(1)
K,M | in (118). It is clear that∣∣∣Gˆ(j,1)K,M −G(1)K,M ∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln
1− 1
MN+KNS
(
λˆ
(K)
M,j + λˆ
(K)
S,j
)
1− 1
MN+KN
(
λˆ
(K)
M,j + λˆ
(K)
N ,j
) − ln 1− 1MN+KNS (λM + λS)
1− 1
MN+KN (λM + λN )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln
1− 1
MN+KNS
(
λˆ
(K)
M,j + λˆ
(K)
S,j
)
1− 1
MN+KNS
(λM + λS)
− ln
1− 1
MN+KN
(
λˆ
(K)
M,j + λˆ
(K)
N ,j
)
1− 1
MN+KN (λM + λN )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln
1− 1
MN+KNS
(
λˆ
(K)
M,j + λˆ
(K)
S,j
)
1− 1
MN+KNS
(λM + λS)
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln
1− 1
MN+KN
(
λˆ
(K)
M,j + λˆ
(K)
N ,j
)
1− 1
MN+KN (λM + λN )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (119)
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Noting that 1− 1/x ≤ lnx ≤ x− 1 and by employing Lemma 1, we can obtain∣∣∣∣∣∣ln
1− 1
MN+KNS
(
λˆ
(K)
M,j + λˆ
(K)
S,j
)
1− 1
MN+KNS
(λM + λS)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ A
(1,1)
K,M
MN +KNS
∣∣∣λˆ(K)M,j + λˆ(K)S,j − λM − λS ∣∣∣
≤
A
(1,1)
K,M
MN +KNS
(∣∣∣λˆ(K)M,j − λM∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣λˆ(K)S,j − λS ∣∣∣)
≤
A
(1,1)
K,MN
3
2
MN +KNS
 [σ2 (Wˇ)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q +
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
 , (120)
where the quantity A
(1,1)
K,M is defined as
A
(1,1)
K,M
∆
= max
 1∣∣∣1− 1MN+KNS (λM + λS)∣∣∣ ,
1∣∣∣1− 1MN+KNS (λˆ(K)M,j + λˆ(K)S,j )∣∣∣
 . (121)
Similarly, the second term in (119) can be bounded from above as per∣∣∣∣∣∣ln
1− 1
MN+KN
(
λˆ
(K)
M,j + λˆ
(K)
N ,j
)
1− 1
MN+KN (λM + λN )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ A
(1,2)
K,MN
3
2
MN +KN
( [
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q + [σ2 (W)]Q1− [σ2 (W)]Q
)
, (122)
where A
(1,2)
K,M is defined as
A
(1,2)
K,M
∆
= max
 1∣∣∣1− 1MN+KN (λM + λN )∣∣∣ ,
1∣∣∣1− 1MN+KN (λˆ(K)M,j + λˆ(K)N ,j)∣∣∣
 , (123)
which yields
∣∣∣Gˆ(j,1)K,M −G(1)K,M ∣∣∣ ≤ A(1,1)K,MN 32MN +KNS
 [σ2 (Wˇ)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q +
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q

+
A
(1,2)
K,MN
3
2
MN +KN
( [
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q + [σ2 (W)]Q1− [σ2 (W)]Q
)
(124)
by employing (119) and (120).
Note that∣∣∣∣1− 1MN +KNS
(
λˆ
(K)
M,j + λˆ
(K)
S,j
)∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣1− 1MN +KNS (λM + λS)
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣ 1MN +KNS
(
λˆ
(K)
M,j − λM + λˆ
(K)
S,j − λS
)∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣1− 1MN +KNS (λM + λS)
∣∣∣∣− N 32MN +KNS
 [σ2 (Wˇ)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q +
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
 , (125)
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which implies
lim
M→∞
∣∣∣∣1− 1MN +KNS
(
λˆ
(K)
M,j + λˆ
(K)
S,j
)∣∣∣∣ ≥ limM→∞
∣∣∣∣1− 1MN +KNS (λM + λS)
∣∣∣∣
= q (θ) a.s. (126)
by employing (16), (87) and the fact that the second term in (125) decreases to 0 as M → ∞. As a
result, from (121) and (126), we can obtain
lim
M→∞
A
(1,1)
K,M = max
 limM→∞ 1∣∣∣1− 1MN+KNS (λM + λS)∣∣∣ , limM→∞
1∣∣∣1− 1MN+KNS (λˆ(K)M,j + λˆ(K)S,j )∣∣∣

=
1
q (θ)
a.s. (127)
Similarly, we can obtain
lim
M→∞
A
(1,2)
K,M =
1
q (θ)
a.s.. (128)
Furthermore, by employing (124), (127) and (128), we have
lim
M→∞
M
∣∣∣Gˆ(j,1)K,M −G(1)K,M ∣∣∣
≤ lim
M→∞
A
(1,1)
K,MMN
3
2
MN +KNS
 [σ2 (Wˇ)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q +
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q

+ lim
M→∞
A
(1,2)
K,MMN
3
2
MN +KN
( [
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q + [σ2 (W)]Q1− [σ2 (W)]Q
)
=
N
1
2
q (θ)
 2[σ2 (Wˇ)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q +
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q + [σ2 (W)]Q1− [σ2 (W)]Q
 a.s.. (129)
By following a similar approach as above, we can obtain
lim
M→∞
M
∣∣∣Gˆ(j,2)K,M −G(2)K,M ∣∣∣
≤
N
1
2
1− q (θ)
 2[σ2 (Wˇ)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q +
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q + [σ2 (W)]Q1− [σ2 (W)]Q
 a.s.. (130)
Moreover, we also have
lim
M→∞
∣∣∣G(1)K,M ∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ limM→∞ ln 1−
1
MN+KNS
(λM + λS)
1− 1
MN+KN (λM + λN )
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ln F (τ − θ)F (τ − θ)
∣∣∣∣ = 0 a.s., (131)
lim
M→∞
∣∣∣G(2)K,M ∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ limM→∞ ln
1
MN+KNS
(λM + λS)
1
MN+KN (λM + λN )
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ln 1− F (τ − θ)1− F (τ − θ)
∣∣∣∣ = 0 a.s.. (132)
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Therefore, from (118), (129), (130), (131) and (132), we can obtain
lim
M→∞
∣∣∣ηˆ(1)K,M,j − η(1)K,M ∣∣∣
≤ N
3
2 lim
M→∞
M
(
2
∣∣∣Gˆ(j,1)K,M −G(1)K,M ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣Gˆ(j,2)K,M −G(2)K,M ∣∣∣)
+N
3
2
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q ( limM→∞ ∣∣∣G(1)K,M ∣∣∣+ limM→∞ ∣∣∣G(2)K,M ∣∣∣
)
= N
3
2
{
2
q (θ)
N
1
2
(
2
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q +
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q + [σ2 (W)]Q1− [σ2 (W)]Q
)
+
1
1− q (θ)
N
1
2
(
2
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q +
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q + [σ2 (W)]Q1− [σ2 (W)]Q
)}
=
N2 [2− q (θ)]
q (θ) [1− q (θ)]
 2[σ2 (Wˇ)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q +
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q + [σ2 (W)]Q1− [σ2 (W)]Q
 a.s., (133)
which completes the proof for (108).
Next, we prove (109). Similar to (110), (111) and (112), we can obtain∣∣∣ηˆ(2)K,M,j − η(2)K,M ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣(KNS − λˆ(K)S,j ) Gˆ(j,1)K,M + λˆ(K)S,j Gˆ(j,2)K,M − (KNS − λS)G(1)K,M − λSG(2)K,M ∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣KNS − λˆ(K)S,j ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣Gˆ(j,1)K,M −G(1)K,M ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣λˆ(K)S,j − λS∣∣∣ ∣∣∣G(1)K,M ∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣λˆ(K)S,j ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣Gˆ(j,2)K,M −G(2)K,M ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣λˆ(K)S,j − λS∣∣∣ ∣∣∣G(2)K,M ∣∣∣ (134)
by employing the definitions of η
(2)
K,M and ηˆ
(2)
K,M,j in (68) and (106), respectively.
Note that since σ1(W˜) = 1, |γ˜
(l)
j | ≤ 1, and γ˜
(l)
j = 0 for l ≤M ,∣∣∣λˆ(K)S,j ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣NeTj Γ˜(M+K)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣NeTj
M+K∑
l=1
W˜
Q(M+K−l+1)γ˜(l)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ N‖ej‖2
∥∥∥∥∥
M+K∑
l=M+1
W˜
Q(M+K−l+1)γ˜(l)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ N
M+K∑
l=M+1
∥∥∥W˜Q(M+K−l+1)γ˜(l)∥∥∥
2
≤ KN
3
2 , (135)
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which yields ∣∣∣ηˆ(2)K,M,j − η(2)K,M ∣∣∣ ≤ 2KN 32 ∣∣∣Gˆ(j,1)K,M −G(1)K,M ∣∣∣+KN 32 ∣∣∣Gˆ(j,2)K,M −G(2)K,M ∣∣∣
+N
3
2
[σ2 (W)]
Q
1− [σ2 (W)]
Q
(∣∣∣G(1)K,M ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣G(2)K,M ∣∣∣) (136)
by employing (134) and Lemma 1. As a result, from (129), (130), (131) and (132), we know
lim
M→∞
∣∣∣ηˆ(2)K,M,j − η(2)K,M ∣∣∣ = 0 a.s. (137)
which completes the proof.
Notably, the estimation performances of ηˆ
(1)
K,M,j and ηˆ
(2)
K,M,j are different in the asymptotic regime
where M →∞. Theorem 4 demonstrates that as M →∞, the estimation error of ηˆ
(2)
K,M,j decreases to 0
with probability one, while the estimation error of ηˆ
(1)
K,M,j only can be bounded above with probability
one. This is mainly because, as shown by (105) and (106), ηˆ
(1)
K,M,j is scalable with respect to M while
ηˆ
(2)
K,M,j is not. However, the estimation error of ηˆ
(1)
K,M,j still can be controlled just by increasing the
number of message-passing rounds Q in each sampling interval, i.e., as Q → ∞, the upper bounds in
(108) and (109) decrease to 0.
D. Distributed Computation of max1≤k≤Kη
(4)
K,M
At last, we consider the distributed computation of the term max1≤k≤Kη
(4)
K,M in (68). From (68), we
know max1≤k≤Kη
(4)
K,M = max1≤k≤K
∑K
i=k
∑
j∈A φ
(4)
ji which implies that all the attacked sensors are
stricken at the same time, i.e., they share the same estimate of the attack time. This underlying assumption
inhibits the distributed computation of max1≤k≤K
∑K
i=k
∑
j∈A φ
(4)
ji , since estimating the attack time (the
maximization operation over k) requires all sensor data up to time K can be processed at a single place.
To this end, we relax the constraint of simultaneous attack and assume that the attack times at different
sensors are different. In consequence, we modify the term max1≤k≤K
∑K
i=k
∑
j∈A φ
(4)
ji by allowing each
sensor to search its own attack time, that is
max
1≤k≤K
η
(4)
K,M = max1≤k≤K
K∑
i=k
∑
j∈A
φ
(4)
ji ⇒ max
1≤k≤K
η
(4)
K,M ≈
∑
j∈A
max
1≤kj≤K
K∑
i=kj
φ
(4)
ji︸ ︷︷ ︸
,ψ
(K)
j
. (138)
It is worth mentioning that in the case where adversaries cannot perfectly synchronously launch attacks at
sensors (e.g., attack times at different sensors can be distinct), searching the attack time at each individual
sensor is expected to be more reasonable and effective. Moreover, this idea of allowing each sensor to
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search its own attack time is widely employed in the quickest detection in sensor networks, see [33],
[34], [44] for instance.
The quantity ψ
(K)
j in (138) can be recursively expressed as
ψ
(K)
j = max
1≤kj≤K
K∑
i=kj
φ
(4)
ji = max
{
max
1≤kj≤K−1
K∑
i=kj
φ
(4)
ji , φ
(4)
jK
}
= max
{
ψ
(K−1)
j , 0
}
+ φ
(4)
jK (139)
with ψ
(0)
j = 0. Moreover, from (66), φ
(4)
ji can be rewritten as
φ
(4)
ji = ln
P1
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(a), µˆj )
P0
(
u
(i)
j
∣∣∣θˆ(u)MLE)
=
(
1− u
(i)
j
)
ln
ζ
(K)
j
1− 1(M+K)N (λM + λN )
+ u
(i)
j ln
1− ζ
(K)
j
1
(M+K)N (λM + λN )
, (140)
where the statistic ζ
(K)
j is defined as
ζ
(K)
j ,1 {µ˜j ≥ b}
1− 1
K − kj + 1
K∑
i=kj
u
(i)
j

+ 1 {µ˜j < b}F
(
F−1
(
1−
1
MN +KNS
(λM + λS)
)
− b
)
, (141)
and µ˜j is given by (65) except that k is replaced by kj .
In order to compute φ
(4)
ji locally at the j-th sensor, motivated by Lemma 1, we employ the estimators
λˆ
(i)
M,j and λˆ
(i)
S,j as respective substitutes for λM and λN in the definition of µ˜j , (140) and (141). In
addition, noticing that the term 1
K−kj+1
∑K
i=kj
u
(i)
j in (141) only utilizes more recent data and ignores
the earlier data, we can employ
λˆ
(K)
A,j
∆
=
1
K∑
l=1
αK−l
K∑
l=1
αK−lu
(l)
j =
1− α
1− αK
K∑
l=1
αK−lu
(l)
j with α < 1 (142)
to approximate 1
K−kj+1
∑K
i=kj
u
(i)
j which is from the widespread intuitive idea of exponential weighting
of observations which uses higher weights on the recent observations and lower weights on past ones
[22], [23]. As such, φ
(4)
ji can be approximated by φˆ
(4)
ji which can be expressed as
φˆ
(4)
ji =
(
1− u
(i)
j
)
ln
ζˆ
(i)
j
1− 1(M+i)N
(
λˆ
(i)
M,j + λˆ
(i)
N ,j
) + u(i)j ln 1− ζˆ(i)j1
(M+i)N
(
λˆ
(i)
M,j + λˆ
(i)
N ,j
) , (143)
where ζˆ
(i)
j is defined as
ζˆ
(i)
j
∆
=1
{
µ˜
(i)
j ≥ b
}(
1− λˆ
(i)
A,j
)
+1
{
µ˜
(i)
j <b
}
F
(
F−1
(
1−
1
MN + iNS
(
λˆ
(i)
M,j + λˆ
(i)
S,j
))
−b
)
(144)
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and µ˜
(i)
j is given by
µ˜
(i)
j
∆
= F−1
(
1−
1
MN + iNS
(
λˆ
(i)
M,j + λˆ
(i)
S,j
))
− F−1
(
1− λˆ
(i)
A,j
)
. (145)
It is seen from (143), (144) and (145) that φˆ
(4)
ji can be calculated locally by using local estimators.
Furthermore, from (142), the local statistic λˆ
(i)
A,j can be recursively written as
λˆ
(i)
A,j =
1− α
1− αi
(
α
i−1∑
l=1
αK−l−1u
(l)
j + u
(i)
j
)
=
α− αi
1− αi
λˆ
(i−1)
A,j +
1− α
1− αi
u
(i)
j , (146)
which can further facilitate the distributed computation based on running consensus algorithms.
By employing (139) and (143), the corresponding estimate ψˆ
(K)
j of ψ
(K)
j can be expressed as
ψˆ
(K)
j = max
1≤kj≤K
K∑
i=kj
φˆ
(4)
ji = max
{
ψˆ
(K−1)
j , 0
}
+ φˆ
(4)
jK with ψˆ
(0)
j = 0, (147)
which yields that max1≤k≤Kη
(4)
K,M can be approximated by
η¯
(3)
K,M
∆
=
∑
j∈A
max
1≤kj≤K
K∑
i=kj
φˆ
(4)
ji =
∑
j∈A
ψˆ
(K)
j =
∑
j∈A
M+K∑
l=1
ξ
(l)
j (148)
where the j-th element ξ
(l)
j of the vector ξ
(i) = [ξ
(i)
1 , ξ
(i)
2 , ..., ξ
(i)
N ]
T is defined as
ξ
(i)
j
∆
=
 ψˆ
(i−M)
j − ψˆ
(i−M−1)
j , i ≥M + 1 and j ∈ A,
0, otherwise,
(149)
It is seen from (148) that η¯
(3)
K,M is a sum of local statistics over sensors and over time. Thus, similar to
the estimator λˆ
(i)
M,j , by using (149), we also can employ the running consensus algorithm to compute
η¯
(3)
K,M at each sensor in a distributed way
ηˆ
(3)
K,M,j
∆
= eTj
M+K∑
l=1
W¯
Q(M+K−l+1)ξ(l) = eTj
K∑
l=1
W¯
Q(K−l+1)ξ(l+M). (150)
E. Distributed Approximate Generalized CUSUM
Based on (105), (106) and (150), we define the local test statistic at the j-th sensor as follows
H
(D)
K,M,j
∆
= ηˆ
(1)
K,M,j + ηˆ
(2)
K,M,j + ηˆ
(3)
K,M,j. (151)
Consequently, the distributed approximate generalized CUSUM (DAG-CUSUM) test at the j-th sensor
can be written as
T
(D)
j = min
{
K : H
(D)
K,M,j ≥ h
}
. (152)
32
Comparing H
(A)
K,M in (68) with H
(D)
K,M,j in (151), we know∣∣∣H(D)K,M,j −H(A)K,M ∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ηˆ(1)K,M,j − η(1)K,M ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣ηˆ(2)K,M,j − η(2)K,M ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ηˆ(3)K,M,j − max1≤k≤K η(4)K,M
∣∣∣∣ (153)
which yields
lim
M→∞
∣∣∣H(D)K,M,j −H(A)K,M ∣∣∣ ≤ N2 [2− q (θ)]q (θ) [1− q (θ)]
(
2
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q +
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
W˜
)]Q
+
[σ2 (W)]
Q
1− [σ2 (W)]
Q
)
+ lim
M→∞
∣∣∣∣ηˆ(3)K,M,j − max1≤k≤K η(4)K,M
∣∣∣∣ a.s. (154)
by employing Theorem 4. The first term on the right-hand side of (154) is a constant. Thus, in the case
where h is sufficiently large, the relative error induced by the first term can be neglected, since when
alarm is triggered, H
(D)
K,M,j, H
(A)
K,M ≥ h. In addition, the first term can be reduced to arbitrarily small just
by increasing the number of message-passingsQ in each sampling interval. To this end, in the asymptotic
regime where M → ∞, the difference between H
(A)
K,M and H
(D)
K,M,j is mainly determined by the term
limM→∞|ηˆ
(3)
K,M,j −max1≤k≤Kη
(4)
K,M | which might induce possible performance loss.
Due to the relaxation employed in (138), it seems impossible to analytically characterize limM→∞|ηˆ
(3)
K,M,j−
max1≤k≤Kη
(4)
K,M |. As shown in the numerical results in the next section, the performance of the DAG-
CUSUM in (152) is comparable to that of GCUSUM in (8). It is worth mentioning that the proposed
DAG-CUSUM features some merits when compared to the GCUSUM. To be specific, it is seen from
(8) that for each K, the computation of the test statistic of the GCUSUM requires an exhaustive search
over k. Thus, if the stopping time of the GCUSUM is equal to K, the computational complexity of
GCUSUM is O(K2). In contrast, since the test statistic of DAG-CUSUM can be written in a recursive
form, the computational complexity of the DAG-CUSUM is only O(K), which implies that a significant
computational complexity reduction can be achieved when employing the DAG-CUSUM, especially in the
case where h is large. Moreover, as mentioned before, the GCUSUM requires centralized processing, while
the DAG-CUSUM can be implemented in a distributed way. Therefore, the long-distance communication
overheads can be spared when employing the DAG-CUSUM. We summarize the procedure for computing
the DAG-CUSUM at one sensor in Algorithm 1.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we examine the performance of the DAG-CUSUM in (152) and compare it to that of
GCUSUM in (8).
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Algorithm 1 Distributed computation of the DAG-CUSUM at the j-th sensor
1: Input: {uˇ
(m)
j }, {u
(i)
j }, Wˇ, W, W˜, W¯, Q, α and h;
2: Output: T
(D)
j ;
3: Γˇ(0) ← 0;
4: for m = 1 to M do
5: Evaluate γˇ(m) by using (89);
6: Using γˇ(m) to evaluate Γˇ(m) by employing the running consensus algorithm with the weight matrix
Wˇ as in (99);
7: end for
8: λˆ
(0)
M,j ← Ne
T
j Γˇ
(M), λˆ
(0)
S,j ← 0 and λˆ
(0)
N ,j ← 0;
9: Using λˆ
(0)
M,j , λˆ
(0)
S,j and λˆ
(0)
N ,j to evaluate ηˆ
(1)
0,M,j as in (105);
10: H
(D)
0,M,j ← ηˆ
(1)
0,M,j and T
(D)
j ← 0;
11: Γ(M) ← 0, Γ˜(M) ← 0, λˆ
(0)
A,j ← 0 and K ← 0;
12: while H
(D)
K,M,j < h do
13: K ← K + 1;
14: Evaluate γˇ(M+K), γ(M+K) and γ˜(M+K) by using (89), (90) and (91), respectively;
15: Using γˇ(M+K), γ(M+K) and γ˜(M+K) to evaluate Γˇ(M+K), Γ(M+K) and Γ˜(M+K) by employing
the running consensus algorithm with Wˇ, W and W˜ as in (99);
16: λˆ
(K)
M,j ← Ne
T
j Γˇ
(M+K), λˆ
(K)
S,j ← Ne
T
j Γ
(M+K) and λˆ
(K)
N ,j ← Ne
T
j Γ˜
(M+K);
17: λˆ
(K)
A,j ←
α−αi
1−αi λˆ
(K−1)
A,j +
1−α
1−αiu
(K)
j ;
18: Using λˆ
(K)
M,j , λˆ
(K)
S,j and λˆ
(K)
N ,j to evaluate ηˆ
(1)
K,M,j, ηˆ
(2)
K,M,j as in (105) and (106), respectively;
19: Using λˆ
(K)
A,j , λˆ
(K)
M,j , λˆ
(K)
S,j and λˆ
(K)
N ,j to evaluate ξ
(K) as in (149);
20: Using ξ(K) to evaluate ηˆ
(3)
K,M,j by employing the running consensus algorithm with W¯ as in (150);
21: H
(D)
K,M,j ← ηˆ
(1)
K,M,j + ηˆ
(2)
K,M,j + ηˆ
(3)
K,M,j;
22: T
(D)
j ← K;
23: end while
A. Choice of Wˇ, W and W˜
First, we specify the weight matrices Wˇ,W and W˜ in (98). There are multiple methods to choose W
such that Condition 1 can be satisfied, one of which is assigning equal weights to the data from neighbors
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[45]. Here, we employ a similar idea as that in [45] and choose Wˇ = W = W˜ In specific, the weight
matrix W admits
W = I−
2 (D−A)
σ21 (D−A) + σ
2
N−1 (D−A)
, (155)
where A is the adjacent matrix, whose entries aij = 1 if and only if i, j ∈ E and the matrix D ,
diag{|N1|, |N2|, ..., |NK |} is called degree matrix. Their difference is called Laplacian matrix which is
positive semidefinite. It can be shown that W in (155) satisfies Condition 1 [45].
B. Simulation Setup
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Fig. 1: The topology of the sensor network.
Consider a sensor network consisting of 12 sensors which is depicted in Fig. 1. The blue circles
represent secure sensors and the red ones are insecure. The edges of the graph are represented by the
dash lines. The weight matrix in (155) for the graph in Fig. 1 has σ2(W ) = 0.6511.
In the simulation, the unknown parameter θ = 1, the threshold of the quantizers is τ = 1, and the
injected data µj = 0.2 for all j. The noise n
(k)
j in (1) obeys Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit
variance for all j and k. Moreover, the lower bound b on the injected data in (4) is 0.18, the attack time
ta is set to 10. In addition, for the DAG-CUSUM, Q = 10, the parameter α = 0.979 and M = 5× 10
3.
In Fig. 2, we compare the proposed DAG-CUSUM in (152) with the centralized GCUSUM in (8) in
terms of the average detection delay as the false alarm period increases. The number of Monte Carlo runs
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Fig. 2: Performance comparison between the centralized GCUSUM and the DAG-CUSUM at different
sensor.
is 2000. Fig. 2 illustrates that when the DAG-CUSUM is employed, for any given false alarm period,
the average detection delay of each sensor is very close to that of other sensors, which implies that the
sensors, no matter attacked or unattacked, can detect the occurrence of attacks almost simultaneously. It
is worth mentioning that it takes way more time to obtain the curve for the centralized GCUSUM than
the curves for the DAG-CUSUM. Specifically, the running time for obtaining the curve for the centralized
GCUSUM is about 242 hours; while the running time for obtaining the curves for the DAG-CUSUM is
just 742 seconds on the same computer. It is seen from Fig. 2 that by employing the DAG-CUSUM, we
reduce the computational complexity and eliminate the global communication overheads at the price of
some performance loss, since the performance of the centralized GCUSUM outperforms that of every
sensor when the DAG-CUSUM is employed. This performance loss is possibly mainly induced by the
relaxation in (138).
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the generalized CUSUM algorithm for change detection in the presence of unknown
parameters in both the pre-change and post-change models, in the context of quickest attack detection in a
distributed parameter estimation system with one-bit quantized measurements. First, a sufficient condition
is provided under which the expected false alarm period of the GCUSUM test can be guaranteed to be
larger than any given value. Since the centralized GCUSUM incurs significant communication overhead,
and moreover, has a prohibitively high computational complexity, we therefore focus on developing
the distributed implementation of the GCUSUM. An alternative test statistic is first proposed as a
substitute for that of GCUSUM which can be shown to be asymptotically equivalent. Then based on the
proposed alternative test statistic and running consensus algorithms, we have proposed the DAG-CUSUM
which significantly reduce the computational complexity and requires only local communications between
neighboring sensors. The numerical results show that the proposed DAG-CUSUM algorithm can provide
a performance that is comparable to the centralized GCUSUM.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We will just prove (102), and the proofs for (103) and (104) are similar.
By employing (89), (87) and (101), we can obtain∣∣∣λˆ(K)M,j − λM∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣NeTj Γˇ(M+K) −∑
i∈N
M∑
m=1
uˇ
(m)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣NeTj
(
Γˇ
(M+K) −
M∑
m=1
Jγˇ(l)
)∣∣∣∣∣ , (156)
where the matrix J is defined as
J ,
11
T
N
. (157)
From the definition of J in (157) and Condition 1, we have
Wˇ
n − J =
(
Wˇ − J
)n
, ∀n = 1, 2, ..., (158)
which can be proved by induction as follows:1) For n = 1, it is clear that (158) is true; 2) assume that
Wˇ
n − J =
(
Wˇ− J
)n
for some n, then(
Wˇ− J
)n+1
=
(
Wˇ − J
) (
Wˇ − J
)n
=
(
Wˇ − J
) (
Wˇ
n − J
)
= Wˇn+1 − WˇJ− JWˇn + J2
= Wˇn+1 − J, (159)
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where (159) is due to the fact that J2 = J and WˇJ = JWˇn = J by employing (157) and Condition 1.
As a result, by employing (99), (156) can be simplified as∣∣∣λˆ(K)M,j − λM∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣NeTj
(
Γˇ
(M+K) −
M∑
m=1
Jγˇ(l)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣NeTj
M+K∑
l=1
(
Wˇ
Q(M+K−l+1) − J
)
γˇ(l)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣NeTj
M+K∑
l=1
(
Wˇ − J
)Q(M+K−l+1)
γˇ(l)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ N‖ej‖2
∥∥∥∥∥
M+K∑
l=1
(
Wˇ − J
)Q(M+K−l+1)
γˇ(l)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(160)
≤ N
M+K∑
l=1
∥∥∥(Wˇ− J)Q(M+K−l+1)γˇ(l)∥∥∥
2
, (161)
where (160) is from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Noting that ‖Ax‖2 ≤ σ1 (A) ‖x‖2 for any matrix W and vector x, and Condition 1 implies
σ1
(
Wˇ − J
)
= σ2
(
Wˇ
)
, (162)
from (161), we can obtain∣∣∣λˆ(K)M,j − λM∣∣∣ ≤ N M+K∑
l=1
∥∥∥(Wˇ− J)Q(M+K−l+1)γˇ(l)∥∥∥
2
≤ N
M+K∑
l=1
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q(M+K−l+1)∥∥∥γˇ(l)∥∥∥
2
≤ N
3
2
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q
1−
[
σ2
(
Wˇ
)]Q , (163)
where (163) is from the fact that |γ
(l)
j | ≤ 1 for all j and l. This completes the proof.
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